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toward fulfilling these goals. Thus a grave paradox exists. A single
claimant with several distinct, independent claims against a defendant
will find it possible to aggregate his claims to invoke federal jurisdiction
while two or more claimants with substantially similar claims are in the
awkward position of having to litigate such claims against the same indi-
vidual separately, if unable to meet the jurisdictional amount in contro-
versy requirements. The logic behind such a dichotomy is certainly
debilitating to even the keenest procedural stalwart. Though plaintiff's
seeking to vindicate their injuries in a federal court will find themselves
forumless, the results of Zahn will be less harsh in those states that have
provisions for class actions.4 3 It should be noted that the plaintiffs in
Zahn intended to continue their suit separately if their class action status
was terminated." When asked why the suit was not brought in state
court originally, the reply was that the alternative did not exist at that
time.
In retrospect, with the decision in Zahn followed by the result
reached in Eisen, there appears to be little hope for the large scale class
actions once envisioned. Perhaps such a class action procedure was
never meant to be. But, as it stands now clearly the price tag on such
actions is beyond the reach of most litigants. Consequently small
claims will go unvindicated unless potential plaintiffs do their forum
shopping in state courts.
MARY C. TOLTON
Friscia to Scarola:
Changing New York Case Law on Insurable Interest
in Stolen Automobiles
INTRODUCTION
In view of the incidence of car theft in the United States, it is appar-
ent that many automobile theft insurance policies are purchased by
bonafide purchasers of stolen cars. If such an automobile is subse-
quently stolen from the innocent purchaser and -the insurer discovers
that the insured buyer possessed a stolen vehicle, a troublesome ques-
43. N.C. GEN. STATS. lA-l, Rule 23, provides in part:
(a) Representation-If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make
it impractical to bring them all before the court, such of them one or more, as
will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or
be sued.
44. 42 U.S.L.W. 4233 (October 1973).
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tion arises: Does the bonafide purchaser acquire an insurable interest
in the stolen vehicle?'
Many state courts have reviewed this problem frequently as the
status of the automobile has grown into the primary means of transpor-
tation in the United States. The resulting decisions are divided among
these jurisdictions as to whether or not such insurance contracts are sus-
tained by an insurable interest.2
In New York a divergence of opinion on the issue has developed
in the lower courts of the state over the past several years. Before
1968 not one case had been reported that pursued the question of in-
surable interest and stolen automobiles. 3  In the following four years
there were at least six reported suits initiated by insured persons in var-
ious state courts. Although all had similar fact patterns, the decisions
failed ,to provide a uniform response. Then in 1972 the Court of Ap-
peals, over a vigorous dissent, resolved the question in favor of the in-
sured motorist in Scarola v. Insurance Co. of North America.4
A. INSURABLE INTEREST AS AN EXPANDING CONCEPT
Before attempting to evaluate the significance of Scarola and the ac-
companying lower court cases, a general review of the development of
several conceptual foundations for "insurable interest" is appropriate.
This review will ,be coupled with a brief inspection of the codification
of a definition of the -term in New York State Law. The purpose of
this section is only to provide adequate perspective from which the de-
cisions of New York State Courts may be viewed.
Traditionally, public prejudice against insurance has been engen-
dered by the failure of insurers and the law to require an insurable in-
terest in the subject insured. As early forms of insurance contracts fre-
quently could not be distinguished from mere wagers, 5 a strong public
policy developed against the wagering posture of insurance. Thus, "in-
surable interest" became the element which would allow a distinction
to be drawn between an insurance contract and a wager.
Professor William R. Vance explained the historical perspective of
1. Friscia v. Safeguard Ins. Co., 57 Misc. 2d 759, 760, 293 N.Y.S.2d 695, 697
(N.Y.C., Civ. Ct. 1968).
2. Representative cases from several jurisdictions are collected in Annot., 33
A.L.R.3d 1417 (1970).
3. Rossi, Insurance, 1969 Survey of N.Y. Law, 21 SYRACUSE L. REv. 587, 598
(1969).
4. 31 N.Y.2d 411, 292 N.E.2d 776, 340 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1972).
5. Salzman, Law of Insurable Interest in Property, 1966 INS. L.J. 394. This article
provides an adequate review of the historical development of insurable interest including
English decisions and interesting American statutory material.
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insurable interest as a concept that developed as a result of legislative
and judicial reaction to the wagering phenomenon.
In England by statute and in the United States by judicial decision,
mere wagers that affect the existence of property or persons are con-
trary to public policy and void. The term "insurable interest" in its
broadest sense, is applied to that "interest" which the law requires a
person making a contract of insurance to have in the thing or person
insured in order that the contract creating rights and duties so highly
dependent upon chance may escape the condemnation visited upon
wagers. 6
More specifically Professor Vance differentiated between an interest
in property and that in a person. Relating insurable interest to prop-
erty insurance he wrote
The interest in property which the law will allow to :be insured must
be composed of such valuable relations with respect to the property
as the law will recognize and enforce. The contract must provide in-
demnification for possible loss of a legal interest susceptible of pecun-
iary valuation. Nothing less will -take the contract out of the class of
forbidden wagers. 7
Writers on the subject generally agree that it is now a fundamental
rule ,that an insurable interest in property insured is a requisite to the
validity of an insurance contract." An analysis of case law by such com-
mentators has shown that there are as many as four general conceptual
bases upon which an insurable interest may be grounded.9 They are
property rights, contract rights, potential legal liabilities and factual ex-
pectation of damage.'0
The property rights of the insured appear to be -the most common
and clear basis for an interest. Such rights include not only legal and
equitable title, 'but also lesser interests such as a lien and mere posses-
sion. The insured must show some measurable rights either legal or
equitable, to have an interest.'1 Interests may also arise ex contractu.
In some instances the contract will confer an insurable interest even
though there is no legal or equitable property right shown. Further
6. W. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE, 156 (3d ed. 1951) (hereinaf-
ter cited as VANCE).
7. Id.
8. 1 G. RICHARDS, INSURANCE 327 (5th ed. 1952); 2 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW
AND PRACTICE, 761 (1941).
9. Stockton, An Analysis of Insurable Interest Under Article Two of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 17 VAND. L. REv. 815, 816 (1964) (hereinafter cited as Stockton).
See generally Harnett and Thornton, Insurable Interest in Property: A Socio-Economic
Reevaluation of Legal Concept, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 1162, 1165-75 (1948); Note, Insur-
able Interest in Property: An Expanding Concept, 44 IowA L. REV. 513, 513-22 (1959);
Vukovich, Insurable Interests: When it Must Exist in Property and Life Insurance,
WILLIAMETrE L.J. 1, 2-20 (1971).
10. Stockton, supra note 9, at 816. See supporting cases therein.
11. Id.
3
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flexibility and innovation can be found in -the recognition of a potential
liability that may be suffered by an insured substantiating an insurable
interest where no property or contract interest can be found.
The broadest and perhaps the most progressive basis is the factual
expectation of damage concept of insurable interest. Under this theory
an insurable interest is present if the insured, independent of the insur-
ance policy, "will gain economic advantage from the continued exist-
ence of the insured property, or will suffer economic disadvantage on
damage of the property."' 2
As exponents of this theory have written, a connection exists be-
tween the property interest and the factual expectation concept.
The property right conception is -analytically not separate from the
factual expectation of damage. It is more accurately a grouping of
individuals who are most likely to suffer damage; ,their factual expecta-
tion is high. But, as previously indicated, while the physical owner is
the most probable loser, others may similarly suffer pecuniary setback
upon the destruction of the insured property, and often -to a greater
extent than a nominal owner. Recognition of this has led to an expan-
sion of the property right concept -to include all those having enforce-
able in rem right in the insured property unit. 13
It has been stated by these proponents of -the factual expectation of
damage theory that the New York State statute defining insurable inter-
est substantially adopts that concept of insurable interest.' 4  However,
a careful reading of the New York statute leaves questions. The stat-
ute states
No contract or policy of insurance on property made or issued on pro-
perty in this state, shall be enforceable except for .the benefit of some
person having an insurable interest in the property insured. The term
"insurable interest," as used in this section shall be deemed to include
any lawful and substantial economic interest in the safety or preser-
vation of property from loss, destruction or pecuniary damage. 15
It is clear that -this language supports the factual expectation theory
in some respects. Surely, "substantial economic interest in the safety
or preservation of property" suggests this approach. However, a ques-
tion arises in consideration of the word "lawful". This term may be
12. Harnett and Thornton, Insurable Interest in Property: A Socio-Economic Re-
evaluation of a Legal Concept, 48 CoLuM. L. REV. 1162, 1171-75 (1948) (hereinafter
cited as Harnett and Thornton).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1175 n.83. See also Note, Insurable Interest in Property: An Expanding
Concept, 44 IOWA L. REV. 520 (1959).
15. N.Y. INS. LAW § 148 (McKinney 1966). Emphasis is supplied. Similar dif-
ficulties in statutory construction have been met in applying statutes concerning defini-
tions of insurable interest. See ARiZ. REV. STAT. § 20-1105(B) (1956); REV. STAT. OF
NEB. § 44-103(b) (1968); W. VA. CODES § 33-6-3(b) (1966).
4
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construed to provide justification for requiring some legal basis for the
interest in addition to -the "substantial economic" requisite. Yet, in the
alternative, "lawful" may be included only to prohibit bad faith or ille-
gality on the part of -the insured in representing the property he wishes
to insure. A second question of construction arises in the interpreta-
tion of the word "substantial" and will -be addressed in an analysis of
the dissenting opinion in Scarola."6
The historical development of the insurable interest concept both un-
der existing case law and statutory authority has been checkered with
a variety of foundations for the justification of such an interest. How-
ever, a more precise construction of a definition of the term which
avoids the ambiguity of vague or conflicting language has not become
uniform due to -the intermingling of conceptual theories of varying in-
fluence all seeking to substantiate an insurable interest.
Judges, whom we all know as natural alchemists, are left frantically
struggling to expand a can of worms into a linear function-an exercise
resulting in what is often described as an "expanding legal concept."
B. CASES BEFORE Scarola
In 1968 in the case of Friscia v. Safeguard Insurance Co.'" the plain-
tiff bought a Cadillac and insured it against theft with the Safeguard
Insurance Company. She had purchased the automobile through the
agency of an auto mechanic. Three months later the car was stolen.
Safeguard refused to compensate her for the loss because the insurance
company discovered that at the time the car was transferred to Ms. Fris-
cia it was a stolen car with an altered vehicle identification number and
was owned by a person other than the transferor. Subsequently the
carrier claimed that Ms. Friscia, a bonafide purchaser for value,'18 had
no interest in the stolen vehicle.
When this plaintiff brought her complaint to the Civil Court of New
York City in August 1968, it was conceded in the briefs of counsel for
both parties that there was an absence of both law and statutory author-
ity on point. When the defendant's policy was introduced into evi-
dence, counsel for the defendant cited cases originating in other juris-
dictions which the court said involved the interpretation of policy pro-
visions not contained in the plaintiff's policy. There was no elaboration
on this point, the implication being that the defendant's argument
had diminished force. Nevertheless, the court ruled for the defendant
16. See note 59 and accompanying text.
17. 57 Misc. 2d at 759, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
18. Id. at 759-60, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 695-96.
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insurer based on its own interpretation of § 148 of the New York Insur-
ance Law.19
The court noted that the character of an insurable interest need not
be legal or equitable title, but merely such an interest as the insured
would gain advantage by the existence of the property, or suffer loss
by its destruction. Such language seems to reflect the factual expecta-
tion of damage theory which recurs in subsequent cases. However, it
was the opinion of the court that Ms. Friscia did not have a "substan-
tial" economic interest under the statutory guidelines. Though the true
owner was nowhere to be found at -the time of trial, the court reasoned
that the vehicle could be taken from the plaintiff at any time by that
original owner, should he ever appear and make a claim. The court
maintained -that such "tenuous" possession gave the plaintiff no sub-
stantial economic interest under the New York insurance statute. 20
The judge rebutted the theory of estoppel urged by the plaintiff on
the grounds that the defendant had accepted premiums which it had
not offered to refund, and that the evidence on which it relied at trial
was as available when the policy was procured. The Court struck a
familiar image distasteful to insurers.
The personification of the carrier so created - plump and placid
collecting premiums on cars whether stolen or not, and then galvani-
ized into lean, resolute action when a claim is filed--does in fact ap-
peal to the court's sense of injustice. But no estoppel is thus created.
Legally, the insurer is under no obligation to investigate the title to its
policyholders' cars; and in the absence of such a duty, no estoppel can
be created by the failure to so investigate. 2
Friscia was a case of first impression for the New York court. Judge
Martin B. Stecher's opinion incorporated several cases supporting and
interpreting Insurance Law § 14822 but none appeared which directly
paralleled the fact situation and issue raised in Friscia. In effect the
court was left 'to decide whether or not the bona fide purchaser in pos-
session of property, absent the true owner, could sustain an insurable
interest. Judge Stecher decided not to expand the insurable interest
concept.
19. Id. at 760, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
20. Id. at 761-62, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 697. Cf. Reif v. Insurance Co. of North
America, 33 Misc. 2d 961, 223 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1961). The court also noted that this
case is distinguished from that of the finder of lost property where an insurable interest
has been held because the finder's right may mature into title under New York Statute.
21. Friscia v. Safeguard Ins. Co., 57 Misc. 2d at 761, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
22. Id. at 761, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 696. See Nieschlag and Co. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins.
Co., 43 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y.), af 'd, 126 F.2d 834 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 .U.S.
640 (1942); Curacao Trading Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 50 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y.),
af'd, 137 F.2d 911 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 765 (1944) interpreting Insurance
Law § 148.
6
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The Court failed to review the practical difficulty of finding -the true
owners under conditions where cars are stolen and transported far from
the point of theft, altered for sale, and transferred to unwitting buyers.
Nor did the court view -the price paid by the plaintiff and his incon-
venience in being without a vehicle as a loss of a "substantial economic
interest" under the law. Noting that "possession is, in effect, title,"
the court said the probability, however remote, of -the -true owner ap-
pearing made the possession too "tenuous" to support an interest. 23
Judge Stecher's ruling merely affirmed the general rule of property law
that one purchasing stolen property acquires no better title than the
seller, even when that person is a bona fide purchaser.24
Here is an example of the intermingling of bases for an interest. In
its opinion the court in Friscia supports the broad interpretation of the
statute which reflects -the factual expectation of damage concept. Yet,
in its holding the court retreats to a more traditional rule of property
that the possibility of the appearance of the true owner or the possibil-
ity of his being discovered supersedes any interest of the innocent pur-
chaser.
In October 1968 a similar case appeared in Supreme Court, Kings
County New York. 25  The factual situation is very much the same as
Friscia. Plaintiff, Mr. Leonard Lindner, was the innocent purchaser of
a late model Cadillac which he insured for the purchase price of $5300
with the defendant, Hartford Fire Insurance Company. One month
later the car was stolen. Thereafter the insurer discovered that the car
that Mr. Lindner had purchased had been stolen from its original owner
who could not be found. The court decided in direct opposition to the
Friscia case and in favor of the insured plaintiff, holding that an inno-
cent purchaser of a stolen automobile had an insurable interest
therein.26
The court either overlooked or ignored the contrary decision in Fris-
cia as Judge Kern noted counsel's reliance on cases in other jurisdic-
tions and their use of secondary sources to support their positions.
Lindner emphasized that neither legal nor equitable title is essential
to a finding of an insurable interest. Citing abundant authority the court
said that all that need be shown by the defendant is an economic inter-
est in property,
23. Friscia v. Safeguard Ins. Co., 57 Misc. 2d at 769, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
24. See Herrington v. American Security Ins. Co., 124 Ga. App. 617, 184 S.E.2d
673 (1971); Hessen v. Iowa Auto Mut. Ins. Co., 195 Iowa 141, 190 N.W. 150 (1922).
See also Annot. 33 A.L.R.3d 1417 (1968).
25. Lindner v. Hartford Fire Co., 58 Misc. 2d 86, 294 N.Y.S.2d 422 (Sup. Ct.,




McCrann: Friscia to Scarola: Changing New York Case Law on Insurable Inter
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1974
INSURABLE INTERESTS
• . .by the existence of which (the insured) will gain an advantage or
by the destruction of which he will suffer a loss, whether he has or has
not any title in, or lien upon possession of the property itself.27
The court noted that this plaintiff had possession at the time the pol-
icy was written and just before the time of loss. On this basis the court
reasoned ,that an innocent purchaser for value could successfully defend
his possession of the vehicle against all but the true owner and that
such a possessory right was sufficient to give the plaintiff an insurable
interest. Further, it was suggested that the insured might never have
been called upon to defend his possession and -that the expectation of
benefit derived from the protection and preservation of property was
therefore within the statutory meaning of "substantial economic inter-
est."
However, the lower court's judgment was reversed in 1969.28 The
Appellate Division ruled that the evidence established that the plaintiff
was not an innocent purchaser for value and did not have an insurable
interest in the car. The appellate court made it clear that it was not
ruling directly on the issue of insurable interest in stolen vehicles by
stating:
In view of this determination, we neither reach nor decide the ques-
tion whether an innocent purchaser of a stolen car has an insurable
interest in it.29
The Appellate Division ruling established what was already clear,
that there must be a purchase in good faith, but the problem of insur-
able interest in stolen property would remain unsettled. In Lindner
the Court strongly supported the factual expectation of loss test by in-
terpreting the statute and determining the existence of an interest.
Perhaps some of the zeal of the lower court for an expansive view of
the concept of what constitutes an insurable interest should have been
applied to the facts regarding innocence of purchase.
Since Lindner at least four additional cases involving the insurable
interest issue have been reported prior to Scarola. Pistoia v. Empire
Mut. Ins. Co.30 was heard in Civil Court of the City of New York,
Brooklyn County in March 1969. The result was a verdict for the de-
fendant insurer, and no appeal was taken. In February 1969 in a court
of similar jurisdiction in Richmond County, a verdict was rendered for
27. Id. at 88, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 424. See Fulwiler v. Traders and Gen. Ins. Co., 59
N.M. 366, 285 P.2d 140 (1955); Riggs v. Commercial Mut. Ins. Co., 125 N.Y. 7, 25
N.E. 1058 (1890); Rohrback v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 62 N.Y. 47 (1875); Modern
Music Shop v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 131 Misc. 305, 226 N.Y.S. 630 (1927); Tischen-
dorf v. Lynn Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 190 Wis. 33, 208 N.W. 490 (1926).
28. Lindner v. Hartford Fire Co., 33 App. Div. 2d 686, 306 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1969).
29. Id. at 686, 306 N.Y.2d at 256.
30. (Brooklyn Cir. Ct., March 1969) in 161 N.Y.L.J. 18 (March 12, 1969).
8
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the plaintiff in Perrotta v. Empire Mut. Ins. Co.31 This judgment was
reversed as was Lindner on the grounds that the plaintiff was not an
innocent purchaser for value.
The facts in Pistoia bear similarity to those in Friscia and Lindner
with some notable exceptions. The identity of the true owner of the
vehicle was known, which made the plaintiffs possessory right vulner-
able as a basis for an interest. Also, the plaintiff in Pistoia gave two
different addresses of -the person from whom he allegedly bought the
automobile in question. Both addresses were non-existent.3 2
After mentioning Friscia and Lindner and noting the reference in
the Lindner opinion to the position expressed by Professor Vance that
the better view would allow an interest based on the qualified posses-
sory right of an innocent purchaser of a stolen automobile,"3 the court
distinguished Pistoia on the grounds of a lack of good faith and the
presence of the true owner.
Lack of good faith aside, the court appeared willing to hold that an
insurable interest existed if the true owner could not be found under
the qualified property right concept. Alternatively, the court did not
seem to weigh the plaintiff's economic interest in the car at all. It is
interesting to note that -the court never mentioned the factual expecta-
tion of damage concept which was the substance of the Lindner opin-
ion, though -the court discussed the case at some length.
As in Friscia, -there was comment in Pistoia on the theory of estoppel
as an argument for recovery for the plaintiff. The court stated that
an insurer had the right to rely on a statement made in the application
for a policy, that the applicant or insured was the owner of the property
sought to be insured. "No investigation is required by the insurer to
check such ownership or allegation of ownership." 4  The court contin-
ued by presenting the following analogy to refute the argument of es-
toppel.
To hold that the defendant in the. case. before this court is estopped
31. 62 Misc. 2d 925, 310 N.Y.S.2d 393 (App. T 2d Dep't 1970), rev'd on other
grounds, 35 App. Dir. 2d 961, 317 N.Y.S.2d 779 (2d Dep't 1970).
32. Pistoia v. Empire Mut. Ins. Co. (Brooklyn Civ. Ct., 'March 1969) in 161
N.Y.L.J. 18 (March 12, 1969).
33. Lindner v. Hartford Fire Co., 58 Misc. 2d 86, 294 N.Y.S.2d 422 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 33 App. Div. 2d 686, 306 N.Y.S.2d 255 (2 Dep't
1969). See VANCE, supra note 6, at 171. He states: Inasmuch as one having posses-
sion of a chattel, although acquired by theft or otherwise wrongfully has a possessory
right good as against all the world except the true owner or one having a prior right
of possession, there is no reason why this qualified possessory right should not give him
an insurable interest. So where the insured in good faith purchases an automobile from
a thief, the better view recognizes his interest therein, though there is authority to the
contrary.
34. Pistoia v. Empire Mut. Ins. Co. (Brooklyn Civ. Ct., March 1969) in 161
N.Y.L.J. 18 (March 12, 1969).
9
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from the defense of no insurable interest because of the acceptance
of a premium, is like insuring one's life with a fraudulent misrespre-
sentation in the application, of a most serious nature, and then stating
that the collection of a premium is a waiver of the defense of fraud.8 5
It is clear from both Friscia and Pistoia -that there is no support for
the argument of estoppel without some obligation resting with the in-
surance company to review property ownership. The mere size and
resources of these institutions as against the practical difficulties facing
a detailed check of title by an individual may provide the basis of an
argument for legislation requiring review of -title prior to insurance on
an automobile by an insurer. Perhaps it may even be argued that there
exists an obligation to return premiums if the claim is made by the in-
surance company that there is nothing to insure.8 6
Two cases were mentioned in an opinion issued by an intermediate
court which considered Scarola on its way to the Court of Appeals.8 7
They illustrate the increasing need for a high court ruling on the issue
of insurable interest and stolen vehicles.
In Rogers v. Early8 8 the plaintiff Ms. Rhoda Rogers, brought action
in Civil Court to recover the value of a refurbished 1960 Corvette from
her insurer, Allstate Insurance Company and from 'her immediate
vendor, Benjamin Early. Mr. Early impleaded his vendor which even-
tually resulted in joinder of four successive vendors as parties-defend-
ant. In the investigation of the stolen auto by the carrier's representa-
tive, it was discovered that -the visible engine block serial number was
different from a concealed number on the under side of the engine
block. The two numbers were used to facilitate accurate identification.
The investigator saw the visible number but took the word of police
as -to the concealed number. The insurance company alleged that the
car was not owned by Mr. Early when sold and therefore Mrs. Rogers
had no insurable interest.
It was conceded -that Ms. Rogers and all the vendors in the action
were bona fide purchasers. As in the cases discussed above, the court
noted the requirement of an insurable interest and the plaintiffs bur-
den of proof 'thereof. Yet, the court seemed to believe that the insur-
35. Id.
36. Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 1417, 1419 (1968).
37. See Scarola v. Insurance Company of North America, 67 Misc. 2d 437, 323
N.Y.S.2d 1001 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1971), aff'd, 38 App. Div. 2d 1012, 331 N.Y.S.2d
340, aff'd, 31 N.Y.2d 411, 292 N.E.2d 776, 34 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1972). Cases cited are
Rogers v. Early (Sup. Ct. Kings County, May 1970) in 163 N.Y.L.J. 19 (May 14, 1970)
and Cohen v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co. (Brooklyn Cir. Ct., March 1970) in 163
N.Y.L.J. 2 (March 30, 1970). In the latter case the court denied summary judgment
to the defendant insurer saying there was a triable issue as to insurable interest in a
stolen vehicle.
38. (Sup. Ct. Kings County, May 1970) in 163 N.Y.L.J. 19 (May 14, 1970).
10
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 6, No. 1 [1974], Art. 16
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol6/iss1/16
156 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
able interest concept should be expanded in meaning. Though avoid-
ing the specific language, it is clear that the court favored the factual
expectation of damage theory as a basis for insurable interest. As in
Lindner, the court here cited Riggs v. Commercial Mut. Ins. Co. 9 as
authority for this more progressive view.
The Rogers opinion appeared to reflect the reasoning in Lindner ex-
tensively, but the latter is not cited in that opinion. Instead the court
merely stated there was a "paucity of precedent" and that it must re-
gard the question sub judice as open in New York. In finding for the
plaintiff the court cited a New Jersey Supreme Court case40 as authority
in adopting a position which it felt "justice would dictate as equi-
table."'"
The judge emphasized the necessity of his -ruling for the plaintiff in
the following manner:
To rule otherwise would be unconscionable; since the defendant car-
rier has its premiums and promised to extend the protection to the
insured under such policy. We must not allow the insurance indus-
try to escape its obligations based upon the mere allegation that the
insured car has been stolen. To allow the defendant to collect such
premium and disclaim liability when the event insured against occurs,
would be travesty on justice as well as unjust enrichment. 42
There must have been some reluctance to rely on the merely per-
suasive authority of the New Jersey case and equity as the Court contin-
ued by saying that it was conceivable that the Court of Appeals would
rule on the question of insurable interest and stolen vehicles. There
was concern that the lower court ruling would in some way impair any
possible holding by the high court. Until that ruling, the court felt
compelled to examine the record to ascertain whether the automobile
was actually stolen when transferred from Early to Rogers. Con-
veniently, it was discovered in a review of the record that the represent-
ative of the insurer who investigated the theft did not personally see
the concealed serial number but only -took ,the word of one Detective
Prehn. The investigator had no personal knowledge of the concealed
number and -the plaintiff had no opportunity to examine the detective.
The court held that -the evidence regarding the serial numbers was in-
39. 125 N.Y. 7, 25 N.E. 1058 (1890). See note 27 supra and material to which
it refers.
40. Norris v. Alliance Ins. Co. of Phila., 1 N.J. Misc. 315, 123 A. 762 (1923). This
case was also cited in Lindner, 58 Misc. 2d 86, 89, 294 N.Y.S.2d 422, 424 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1968). Norris held, in effect, that possession was proof enough of tftle
to afford an insurable interest.
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admissible and that as a matter of law the car was not stolen.48
.A reading of the cases that appeared prior to the arrival of Scarola
v. Insurance Company of North America in the New York State Court
of Appeals shows that there was a ripe issue to be considered by the
court. Friscia denied recovery on the ground that there was no insur-
able interest because of the "tenuous" nature of the property interest.
In Lindner, a state appellate court took an opposite position on an iden-
tical set of facts. In addition, Lindner suggested a less strict interpreta-
tion of the Insurance Law coupled with a support of factual expectation
of damage as a basis for an insurable interest. On appeal the issue
of insurable interest was left intentionally unconsidered after the rev-
elation of the plaintiff's bad faith. Pistoia, Perrotta and Rogers only
added to the confusion and indecision on the issue. It was an appropri-
ate time for the court of last resort in New York State to carve out a
niche in their case law relating to -the insurable interest in stolen ve-
hicles.
C. Scarola v. Insurance Co. of North America
Scarola provided the opportunity to decide the issue foreseen by the
lower court in Rogers. Mr. Scarola purportedly purchased a used Cad-
ilac for $4000 from an unknown salesman whom he met 'through his
brother-in-law. At trial the insured failed to produce any documentary
evidence that he actually purchased the car in question. Instead Mr.
Scarola produced his cancelled bankbook showing timely withdrawal of
$2500 and testimony that he had borrowed the balance from his
brother-in-law. The car, which had been previously registered in New
Hampshire, was then registered in New York and a comprehensive in-
surance policy was issued by the appellant carrier. Three days after
purchase the car was stolen and was not recovered. Upon processing
-the theft claim the insurer discovered that the insured automobile had
a false serial number indicating it was stolen, and the insurer disclaimed
liability. The Civil Court of New York held for the insured. The in-
surer appealed the matter and the case reached the Court of Appeals
in December 1972."4
In the majority opinion Judge Bergan noted at -the outset that it had
been affirmed by all courts below that the appellee was a bona fide
purchaser.4" The issue was framed on the assumption that this was
true. In affirming the right of Mr. Scarola to -the proceeds of the insur-
ance policy, the Court stated that the "plaintiff had a right to possession
of the car against any contrary assertion except that of the owner. This
43. Id.
44. 31 N.Y.2d at 412, 414, 292 N.E.2d at 778, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 632-33.
45. Id. at 412, 292 N.E.2d at 776, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
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right under general principles, ought to be regarded as an insurable
interest."46  Judge Bergan cited National Filtering Oil Co. v. Citizens
Ins. Co. of Mo.,47 in support of this finding. He noted that the court
in National Filtering stated
. . an interest, legal or equitable in the property burned is not nec-
essary to support an insurance upon it; that it is enough if the assured
is so situated as to be liable to loss if it be destroyed by the peril
against; that such an interest in property connected with its safety and
situation as will cause the insured to sustain a direct loss from its de-
struction, is an insurable interest; that if there be a right in or against
the property which some court will enforce upon the property, a right
so closely connected with it and so much dependent for value upon
the continued existence of it alone, as that a loss of the property will
cause pecuniary damage to the holder of the right against it, he has an
insurable interest. 48
The court observed that this decision was followed in Riggs, cited
in Lindner above, where it was stated that although a stockholder of
a corporation had neither title to corporate property nor equitable title
which he could convert to legal title, he was deemed to have sufficient
interest in such property to insure it. The example given there was
that the property loss might affect dividends. Following this reasoning
the court in Scarola found that
[the law] recognizes the right of a purchaser of a car in good faith
and for value to possession, it would seem to follow that this right to
possession, limited though it may be, is insurable. 49
Clearly identifiable is -the recognition of an expansion of the strict prop-
erty right concept, wherein the court views those having an enforceable
in rem right in the insured subject matter as able -to claim an interest
which is insurable.50
The public policy problem of wagering in insurance is then men-
tioned. Almost in passing the court explained that the difficulty is
whether an insured, having no real economic interest in the subject
matter insured, is actually making a wagering contract. The court then
cited Corpus Juris Secundum5 1 to illustrate the wagering principle and
in a continued effort to lend credence to an expansion of the insurable
interest
46. Id.
47. 106 N.Y. 535, 13 N.E. 337 (1887). Considered here was the question of
whether one who assigns patents for a manufacturing process has such an interest as
to support insurance of the manufacturing premises and the probable royalties above the
minimum payment on the patent by the assignor.
48. 31 N.Y.2d at 412-13, 292 N.E.2d at 776-77, 34 N.Y.S.2d at 631 (1972).
49. Id. at 413, 292 N.E.2d at 777, 34 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
50. Harnett and Thornton, supra note 12. See quotation to which note refers.
51. 44 C.J.S., Insurance § 175, at 870 (1945).
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• . . great liberality is indulged in determining whether a person had
anything at hazard in the subject matter of the insurance, and any in-
terest which would be recognized by a court of law or equity is an
insurable interest.5 2
The majority opinion in Scarola is more a loosely woven compen-
dium of precedent and theories which support an insurable interest
than it is an incisive review and judgment concerning the issue pre-
sented. The opinion avoids consideration of the statute on insurable
interest and finds instead a case law explanation which supports what
amounts to the factual expectation basis for an insurable interest. This
approach may result from the ambiguity -the court may have seen in
the statutory definition, or from the possible lack of support for the po-
sition the court wished to take. The relationship between an extended
property interest and economic value, used in the trial court was not
explored at length to find what "valuable relation" may 'have been
struck between the plaintiff and the subject matter of the policy.
The dissenting opinion explains its position with more directness
than does the majority. This view promulgates the traditional theory
-that a purchaser of stolen property, having acquired no interest from
the seller, has no insurable interest in the property. Citing Friscia as
better representing the legislative interest underlying § 148 of the
Insurance Law, the dissenting judge took the view -that if the interest
were to be based on an economic interest, the potential loss to the in-
sured must be "substantial" according to the statute. The dissent held
that the plaintiff had no such interest. 3  It further stated that Mr. Scar-
ola's monetary investment was lost at the time of purchase from the
-thief or other non-owner. Having purchased the vehicle from one
without any interest, he acquired only a qualified possessory interest
(as against all but the true owner) which, as enunciated in Friscia, was
so "tenuous" that it might have been terminated at any moment by the
true owner. As such, the value of the qualified possessory interest was
highly speculative, and a loss thereof can hardly be considered "sub-
stantial". If there was a loss it -took place at the point of purchase and
prior to -the issuance of the insurance policy when purchaser had given
another his money in return for what at common law amounted to
no more than mere possession. Such an argument is persuasive.
The dissent concluded that by granting judgment to the insured the
courts were expanding the liability exposure of insurance companies
in -the state, which the court said was a legislative rather than a judicial
52. Norris v. Alliance Inc., 1 NJ. Misc. 315, 123 A. 762 (1923); Barnett v. London
Assur. Corp., 138 Wash. 673, 120 N.W. 498 (1926).
53. 31 N.Y.2d at 416, 29 N.E.2d at 778, 34 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
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function. Therefore the dissent recommended an amendment of §
148 to include innocent purchasers of stolen property. 54
CONCLUSION
Though the issue of whether a bonafide purchaser of a stolen ve-
hicle has an insurable interest where the true owner cannot be found
has now been reviewed by the highest court in New York State, the ques-
tion of whether or not an economic interest alone would sustain an in-
surable interest where the true owner nullifies the possession interest
remains unconsidered. 55  There is support for such a claim in the direc-
tion set by the majority in Scarola, but the insured plaintiff would clearly
have to counter the dissent in its assertion that the pecuniary investment
is lost at time of purchase of the vehicle, not at the time of its insurance.
As the decision in Scarola indicates, the concept of insurable interest
is expanding. Whether or not such expansion is well directed depends
upon the point of view of the observers. Insurers must see the change
as a disturbing development while policy holders would surely justify
the expansion in view of the high cost of premiums. Further, it is
doubtful that an insured would view his or her investment as anything
less than a "substantial economic interest" and his or her possession
as more than merely "tenuous." From the standpoint of practicality
it would appear more difficult for the insured to -thoroughly investigate
the title of his purchase on a one -time basis than it would be for an
insurance company to do the same continually through an organized
method of review. Considering the resources of the insurer and the
regularity with which premiums are collected, the insured should argu-
ably be offered such protection. But as the court in Friscia indicated,
the insurer is presently under no obligation to investigate the title to
its policy -holder's automobile. The confrontation of the courts with -the
issue of expansion of what constitutes an insurable interest has resulted
in conflicting interpretation among various jurisdictions and has eroded
some traditional principles of property law. Perhaps these judicial grop-
ings for a new solid legal conceptualization of what is an insurable in-
terest will bring insurance case law closer to the changing problems
facing property owners in society today.
MICHAEL JONATHAN MCCRANN
54. Id.
55. See, eg., Treit v. Oregon Auto Ins. Co., 262 Or. 549, 499 P.2d 335 (1972).
Where possession of a trailer by a purchaser had already been discovered by the true
owner and an action of conversion had been brought against said purchaser, so that he
could not possibly have been benefited by destruction or disappearance of the trailer,
the purchaser's economic interest in the trailer was held insurable, regardless of whether
he was an innocent purchaser.
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